

# Turnout, Status, and Identity: Mobilizing Latinos to Vote with Group Appeals

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*The rise of micro-targeting in American elections raises new questions about the effects of identity-based mobilization strategies. In this article, we bring together theories of expressive voting with literature on racial and ethnic identification to argue that prior studies, which have found either weak or null effects of identity messages targeting minority groups, have missed a crucial moderating variable—identity strength—that varies across both individuals and communities. Identity appeals can have powerful effects on turnout, but only when they target politicized identities to which individuals hold strong prior attachments. Using two innovative GOTV field experiments that rely on publicly available data as a proxy for identity strength, we show that the effects of both ethnic and national identity appeals among Latinos in California and Texas are conditional on the strength of those identities in different communities and among different Latino subgroups.*

Just as marketers can target individual consumers with personalized advertising, parties and campaigns today can appeal to specific groups of voters with tailored messages through micro-targeting, one of the newest campaign strategies (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Micro-targeting and the ability to manage big data are credited, in part, with delivering the 2012 election victory to President Obama, whose micro-targeting of the electorate played a key role in building his winning coalition around a collection of prominent social identity groups such as youth, African American, Asian American, and Latino<sup>1</sup> voters (Isenberg 2012). Micro-targeting enables organizations interested in mobilizing specific groups of voters to do so using tailored campaign appeals that contain group-specific messages.

Campaigns' increased use of micro-targeting raises new questions about the effectiveness of targeted appeals for mobilizing greater turnout, including whether some individual group members are more responsive to group appeals than others. The existing literature on voter mobilization has failed to provide satisfactory answers to these questions in part because previous studies using get-out-the-vote (GOTV) field experi-

ments largely focused on the average effects of different modes of contact, rather than differences in the content of contact (Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008).<sup>2</sup> A few studies did specifically examine the turnout effects of messages that targeted different segments of racial and ethnic groups (e.g., Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Binder et al. 2014; Green 2004; Matland and Murray 2012; Panagopoulos and Green 2010), but produced mixed results. Other work examining group-specific GOTV messages either failed to show that they increased turnout or found identity-based contact to be no more effective than broad-based appeals to vote out of civic duty or the closeness of the election (García Bedolla and Michelson 2009; Michelson 2003; 2006; Wong 2005).

This apparent weakness of identity-based GOTV appeals presents a puzzle. Race and ethnicity are central features of American politics (Carmines and Stimson 1986; 1989; Hutchings and Valentino 2004), and candidates for office have used targeted ethnic and racial appeals since at least the beginning of the nineteenth century (Abrajano 2010; Andersen 2008). In this current political context, individual group members readily develop psychological attachments to their identity groups (Billing and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1982), and an extensive body of research has shown that shared racial and ethnic identity shapes the political attitudes and behavior of group members (Barreto 2007, 2012; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Dawson 1994; Gay 2001; Huddy 2001; McConaughy et al. 2010; Sanchez 2006b; Schildkraut 2005). If shared in-group identity predicts engagement with and preferences in politics, why are GOTV identity appeals not more effective at increasing turnout?

Building on theories of expressive voting (Barreto 2012; Ishiyama 2012; Rogers, Fox, and Gerber 2013), we argue that existing work on identity-based GOTV appeals has failed to find consistent effects

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We are grateful for project funding from Stanford University's Office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Education, Menlo College, and Princeton University's Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice. We thank Melina Abdullah and Jessica Lavariega Monforti for logistical support; Annie Franco and Joe Tafoya for research assistance; Stephanie Brock for the prerecorded reminders; Lisa García Bedolla for feedback on the initial project design; participants in the Symposium on Politics of Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity (SPIRE) at Rutgers University; and Donald Green, Victoria Shine-man, Matt Barreto, Zoltan Hajnal, Martin Gilens, Amy Lerman, Omar Wasow, Jonathan Kastellec, Tali Mendelberg, Nidia Ruedas-Gracia and Alma N. Garza for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Rachel Stein for her insight and incisive feedback on previous versions of this article. Any remaining errors are ours alone.

<sup>1</sup> In this article we use the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably.

<sup>2</sup> For recent exceptions that varied the content of GOTV contact using social pressure, see Davenport (2010); Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008); Mann (2010); Murray and Matland (2014); Panagopoulos, Larimer, and Condon (2014).

because it ignores a critical moderating variable: identity strength. Prior research shows that identity strength varies both across individuals and the communities in which those individuals are embedded (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Gay 2004; Golash-Boza 2006; Lau 1989; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). Our theory posits that identity appeals work to increase turnout by enhancing the psychological benefits of voting as an act of identity expression, but that such benefits will accrue only to individuals with strong attachments to a politicized group identity. Thus, we expect the impact of GOTV identity appeals to be conditional on variation in identity strength across individuals and communities. By ignoring this variation, previous studies underestimated the effects of GOTV identity appeals because they treated all individuals and communities as equally likely to respond to such appeals.

Which individuals and communities are most likely to exhibit strong group identities? We suggest that, consistent with prior research, individual-level socioeconomic status and community-level economic resources are crucial determinants of identity strength (Dawson 1994; Gay 2004; Golash-Boza 2006; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). Both individual status and community resources are related to a set of processes that shape the degree to which group members will identify with their racial or ethnic subgroup identity or with their superordinate national identity (cf. Transue 2007). In the case of Latinos, we contend that pan-ethnic (Latino and Hispanic) identities will be strong among low-status individuals and in low-resource communities, as well as among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities within Latino-majority population areas. By contrast, national (American) identification will be strong only among high-status Latinos and in high-resource communities, irrespective of Latino population size. We expect this variation in Latino identity strength to moderate the effects of GOTV identity appeals such that in Latino-majority areas, GOTV ethnic identity appeals targeting Latinos will be effective regardless of individual status or community resources, whereas GOTV national identity appeals will increase turnout only among high-status Latinos and in high-resource communities.

We tested our expectations using two randomized field experiments, a powerful method for establishing cause-and-effect relationships that also maximizes external validity by testing effects of real-world interventions on validated turnout in real-world elections (Druckman et al. 2011). Specifically, we conducted a placebo-controlled nonpartisan GOTV experiment on Latino-surname registered voters in Los Angeles County, California, during the 2010 primary election, and a replication experiment on Latino-surname registered voters in Hidalgo County, Texas, during the 2012 primary election. In each experiment we sampled subjects from adjacent communities that varied in terms of economic resources but held constant other crucial factors such as culture, salient political issues and the candidates featured on the ballot. To measure

community resources, we used public data on median household income. To measure individual status, we used voter data on nativity, language use, and length of time an individual had been registered to vote.

Our results show that individual-level status and community-level resources are indeed key moderating variables, missing in previous field experiments on turnout, that condition the effects of targeted identity appeals embedded in GOTV contact. For Latinos who live in low-resource communities, as well as those who are less acculturated and of lower status in American society (foreign born, Spanish speakers, and those recently registered to vote), we found that GOTV appeals that cue ethnic identity consistently mobilize greater turnout, whereas mobilization appeals that cue national identity have negligible or inconsistent effects. In contrast, Latinos who live in high-resource communities and who are more acculturated and of higher status (native born, English speakers, and registered to vote for a longer period of time) are responsive to both ethnic and national identity appeals.

As the United States becomes ever more diverse, understanding the role of racial and ethnic identities in voting behavior is increasingly necessary for making sense of American politics (Bernstein 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016). Our work highlights that group membership does not necessarily entail a strong group identity. The implications of variation in identity strength for voter mobilization are clear: GOTV identity appeals do have the power to motivate greater turnout, but the source of this power lies in the psychological benefits of expressive voting, and these benefits are greatest for those with strong group attachments. Practically, researchers studying the effects of GOTV identity appeals must therefore take variation in identity strength into account when designing their studies.

Theoretically, our work also provides a framework for incorporating variation in identity strength into GOTV field experiments without the need for expensive additional survey data. Using publicly available or otherwise easily obtained measures of differences in status and community resources, we were able to successfully proxy for differences in identity strength in our experiments. Existing literature on group identification suggests other determinants of identity strength that could be measured using readily available data; for example, out-group animosity, in-group population size, and within-group heterogeneity. By leveraging existing research on group identification in combination with the ever-expanding availability of data about individual voters and their local communities, political practitioners and scholars alike are poised to make strides in understanding which identity appeals, in which contexts, and among which groups of voters can successfully mobilize greater turnout.

## PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON VOTER TURNOUT AND GROUP IDENTITY

Candidates and campaigns routinely seek to mobilize voters on the basis of their social group identities,

and race and ethnicity in particular have a long history of being used for such purposes in U.S. elections (Abrajano 2010; Andersen 2008). As voter targeting on the basis of these identities has become easier, a growing number of GOTV field experiments have sought to test whether minority group members can in fact be mobilized to vote (e.g., Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Binder et al. 2014; García Bedolla and Michelson 2009, 2012; Green 2004; Matland and Murray 2012; Michelson 2003, 2006; Michelson, García Bedolla, and McConnell 2009; Panagopoulos and Green 2010; Ramírez 2005, 2007; Wong 2005). This is a question of particular importance to the functioning of American democracy because, despite their growing share of the population, most racial and ethnic minorities continue to turn out and vote at lower rates than whites (File 2013).

Overall, however, GOTV efforts that have incorporated messages explicitly designed to target in-group racial or ethnic identities have either been unsuccessful or had no greater impact than general encouragements to vote. For example, experiments using “green jobs” and other nonracial issues successfully mobilized African American voters (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Green and Michelson 2009), but another large-scale experiment targeting African Americans with explicit GOTV messages about race and racial discrimination produced negligible effects (Green 2004). Large in-language phone banks have successfully mobilized Asian American voters, but scripts emphasizing Asian American community empowerment have proven no more effective than general messages emphasizing the logistics of voting (García Bedolla and Michelson 2009, 2012; Wong 2005). Randomized experiments contacting Latinos have increased turnout, yet experiments that simultaneously tested ethnic solidarity and civic duty or close election messages found no differences across them (García Bedolla and Michelson 2009; Michelson 2003, 2006; Wong 2005).

One possible explanation for the relative weakness of identity-based GOTV appeals is that minority group members are simply harder to mobilize for the same reasons they are less likely to turn out to vote in the first place; for example, more limited resources such as income and education (DeSipio 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Schmidt et al. 2009; Verba and Nie 1987; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Verba et al. 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This explanation, however, is belied by research showing that Latinos, who habitually participate in American elections at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups (Jamieson, Shin, and Day 2002; Nie 2011), can nonetheless be mobilized to vote by personal GOTV contact (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Michelson 2003, 2005; Michelson, García Bedolla, and McConnell 2009); by contact from another Latino (Barreto and Nuño 2009; Shaw, De la Garza, and Lee 2000); in response to messages delivered in their preferred language (Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Binder et al. 2014; Panagopoulos and Green 2010); and when policy proposals that disproportionately affect the Latino community create a threatening policy context (Pan-

toja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003b). Many of these findings mirror results among whites (e.g., Campbell 2004; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin 2006; Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), indicating that Latinos and other minority voters are not simply more difficult to mobilize.

Moreover, the apparent weakness of GOTV identity appeals stands in sharp contrast to numerous studies showing that racial and ethnic minorities are responsive to identity-based cues, such as living in majority-minority districts, having a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot, having a co-ethnic representative, or when a political issue that is salient to the minority community is featured in the election—and these effects seem to work through a sense of group identity or consciousness (Barreto 2007, 2012; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Dawson 1994; Gay 2001; Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Hutchings 1998; McConaughy et al. 2010; Pantoja and Segura 2003a; Sanchez 2006a; Schildkraut 2005). If the activation of a shared in-group identity leads to greater political engagement and candidate support, why are GOTV messages that cue these group identities not more effective in increasing turnout among group members? We argue that the answer to this question lies in recognizing that group membership is not synonymous with group identification.

Much of the prior work on GOTV targeting of racial and ethnic identity groups implicitly assumed that all group members would be equally responsive to these appeals.<sup>3</sup> However, the existing literature on racial and ethnic identity suggests this assumption is unwarranted. Rather, identity strength varies across both individuals and communities as a function of acculturation and available resources (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Chong and Kim 2006; Cohen and Dawson 1993; Gay 2004; Maltby, Rocha, and Alvarado 2015; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). Among Latinos specifically, research finds that those who live in economically disadvantaged areas, as well as Latinos with fewer individual resources and limited English proficiency, and who are foreign born—in other words, low-status Latinos who are less acculturated and possess more limited experience with American society—are more likely to prefer an ethnic over an American identity, report stronger ethnic linked fate, and select “some other race” rather than “white” as their preferred racial identity, compared to more acculturated Latinos with greater resources (Golash-Boza 2006; Pulido and Pastor 2013;

<sup>3</sup> Two prior experiments tested differences in targeting of Latinos using English and Spanish (Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Binder et al. 2014), finding that English-language appeals are effective among English-speaking Latinos and that Spanish-language appeals either have no effect (Binder et al. 2014) or mobilize greater turnout among Spanish-speakers and Latinos who vote infrequently (Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011). These experiments, however, did not directly test whether variation in Latino identity is the source of the differential effects because they did not experimentally vary the specific identity that was cued in the GOTV contact.



Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). In contrast to the common view of Latinos as a unified group, existing research documents substantial variation in the likelihood that a Latino voter will identify first and most strongly with her ethnic group (c.f. Beltrán 2010).

We argue that, by failing to take into account this individual- and community-level variation in identity strength, GOTV studies of identity-based appeals have missed a crucial moderating variable, thereby masking the true effects of these appeals. In the next section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains how the strength of identity group attachments should moderate responsiveness to identity-based GOTV contact.

## THEORY OF EXPRESSIVE VOTING AND GOTV IDENTITY APPEALS

Our theory of voter responsiveness to GOTV identity appeals builds on a conception of turnout as a dynamic process motivated by considerations beyond rational self-interest, which alone cannot explain why millions of individuals cast a vote in uncompetitive elections where they will have no discernible impact on the outcome. From this perspective, voting is an act of identity expression, meaning that “citizens can derive value from voting through what the act displays about their identities” (Rogers, Fox, and Gerber 2013, 99). For the individual group member, voting can serve as a positive affirmation of identity group membership or as an expression of group solidarity and support, both of which convey psychological benefits.

This view is in line with prior research showing that personal contact is effective in mobilizing turnout because it involves voters in an act of social connection (Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008). It is also consistent with research in comparative politics, where scholars have argued that ethnic voting occurs “to affirm group identity” because “voters derive psychological benefits” from supporting their ethnic group and that it is not a result “of rational calculation” (Horowitz 1985; Ishiyama 2012, 763). Previous research also suggests that identity expression is particularly evident when a group is under threat (Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Horowitz 1985) and is explicitly targeted with identity appeals (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Ishiyama 2012; Jackson 2011).

According to Rogers, Fox, and Gerber (2013, 100), identity appeals can mobilize greater turnout by making “salient an identity that a person already likely possesses” and targeting them with messages that “emphasize” and “selectively reinforce the preexisting identity that is most likely to induce the pro-social behavior of voting.” Successfully doing so should enhance the psychological benefits of expressive identity voting and increase the likelihood of turnout among targeted group members. This argument identifies the mechanism through which identity appeals should work, but beyond specifying that the targeted identity must be preexisting, it does not tell us when or

for whom the psychological mechanism is likely to be engaged.

We extend previous work by arguing that the link between GOTV identity appeals and expressive voting depends on two key variables. The first is politicization, meaning the degree to which group members understand their identity to be politically relevant and consequential. Identity politicization, as others have shown, occurs through a process in which associations between an identity and politics are created through targeted communication from elites, geographic concentration, grassroots organizing, intergroup conflicts, and state-sanctioned policies that allocate material resources along group lines and help reify identity-group divisions (Bates 1983; Chong and Kim 2006; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Fearon [2006] 2008; Horowitz 1985; Ishiyama 2012; Laitin 1998; Mora 2014; Padilla 1985; Pérez 2013; Wilkinson 2004; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2014). If an identity is not politicized, then group members will not see voting as a means of affirming their identity or expressing group solidarity, in turn making identity appeals unlikely to mobilize greater turnout.

The second key variable is identity strength. Even if a group identity is highly politicized, we argue that the strength of an individual’s group identity affects the success of identity appeals. Individuals often hold multiple identities (Citrin et al. 2007; Citrin and Sears 2009), and identity strength varies systematically across individuals with differences in their predispositions and their local environments (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; García Bedolla 2005; Golash-Boza 2006; Maltby, Rocha, and Alvarado 2015; Masuoka 2006; Nagel 1994; Padilla 1985; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). If an individual does not feel a strong positive attachment to her group, she will not derive much psychological benefit from engaging in political acts, such as voting, as a means of expressing her identity or affirming solidarity with her group (c.f. García Bedolla 2005). Consequently, GOTV identity appeals are unlikely to motivate greater turnout among individuals with weak or stigmatized attachments to the targeted identity.

The broader point is that we should not expect identity appeals to be equally effective for all members of a targeted group. Our theory suggests instead that identity appeals will be most effective among members of a politicized group who have strong preexisting attachments to the targeted identity. When these conditions are met, identity-based appeals will motivate citizens to participate by increasing the psychological benefits of expressive voting. However, when attachment to the targeted identity group is weak or the identity is not politicized, those benefits are unrealized, and an identity appeal is unlikely to have a significant impact. In practice, this means that campaigns and scholars interested in the turnout effects of GOTV identity appeals should seek to identify, *a priori*, which group members have strong preexisting attachments to a politicized identity because it is among these voters that an

identity appeal will resonate and likely generate greater turnout.

## Applying Our Theory to Latinos

Generally speaking, ethnic and racial minorities have at least two group identities of possible relevance to their voting behavior: their minority subgroup identity and a superordinate national identity (c.f. Transue 2007). In applying our theory to Latino citizens, we focus on pan-ethnicity (Latino or Hispanic) as the subgroup identity and nationality (American) as the superordinate group identity.<sup>4</sup> Prior research shows that pan-ethnic Latino identity is a politicized group construct at the center of recent debates over immigration policy, the electoral fortunes of the two major parties, and recent patterns of Latino political preferences and voting behavior (Barreto and Segura 2014; Hersh and Schaffner 2013; Hopkins 2010; Sanchez 2006a; Weiner 2013). Existing scholarship suggests that the current climate in American politics has raised the political salience of Latino pan-ethnic identity through a confluence of group appeals and attacks on the Latino community over the issue of immigration (Barreto and Segura 2014), helping make explicit the psychological and tangible benefits of Latinos turning out in support of their group's interests (Barreto 2007; Michelson and García Bedolla 2014). Thus, we argue that the current political context is one in which Latino pan-ethnic identity is highly politicized.

At the same time, previous studies have documented substantial variation in the strength of individual Latino attachments to Latino and American identities (Golash-Boza 2006; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011). For example, in a recent survey (Fraga et al. 2006), 63% of Latinos identified strongly as Latino, 24% said they identified somewhat, and 10% identified weakly or not at all. On the same survey, 40% of Latinos said they identified strongly as American, 25% identified somewhat, and 31% identified weakly or not at all. As reviewed previously, studies have also shown that Latino identities vary across community characteristics (Maltby, Rocha, and Alvarado 2015; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). Thus, we expect effects of GOTV identity appeals that cue either a Latino identity or an American identity to vary across both individuals and communities depending on the strength of those identities. Specifically, we posit the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1a:** *Ethnic identity GOTV appeals will increase turnout only among individuals who strongly identify as Latino.*

**Hypothesis 1b:** *Ethnic identity GOTV appeals will increase turnout only in communities with high levels of Latino identification.*

**Hypothesis 2a:** *National identity GOTV appeals will increase turnout only among individuals who strongly identify as American.*

**Hypothesis 2b:** *National identity GOTV appeals will increase turnout only in communities with high levels of American identification.*

In sum, our theory and hypotheses suggest that the apparent weakness of previous results on ethnic and racial group targeting with GOTV appeals may be explained by the failure of these prior studies to make distinctions between those who are strongly and weakly identified group members. Taking this variation into account is both necessary and challenging because of variation across individuals and communities. In the next section we describe how we addressed this challenge using publicly available data on Latino voters and the communities in which they live.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

### Measuring Identity Strength and Turnout

How can we identify individuals and communities with strong group identities without relying on expensive additional survey data? Building on existing research documenting variation in the strength of racial and ethnic identification, we argue that socioeconomic status at the individual level and economic resources at the community level are effective proxies for the strength of Latinos' ethnic and national identity attachments. For individuals and communities, respectively, lower status and fewer resources can proxy for strong ethnic attachments and weak national attachments. At the individual level, lower status Latinos tend to be less educated and less acculturated into mainstream society, and are often first-generation immigrants with limited English-language skills (Barreto and Pedraza 2009; Chong and Kim 2006). As a result, they are less integrated into American politics, have less contact outside of their Latino community, and are more likely to hold strong ethnic attachments and less likely to develop strong American identities (Golash-Boza 2006; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011; Valenzuela 2011). At the community level, lower levels of economic resources often mean lower neighborhood quality, which leads to a sense of relative deprivation, alienation from the broader polity, and stronger ethnic and racial subgroup identities (Gay 2004; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Valenzuela 2011). In other words, low resource levels signal a set of experiences and processes that cultivate and sustain ethnic subgroup identities while simultaneously limiting the potential for mainstream acculturation and national identity adoption.

Conversely, high individual status and high levels of community resources are indicators of strong national identification. For high-status individuals, greater resources and acculturation pave the way for increased contact outside of the Latino community and an

<sup>4</sup> Although Latinos also have strong national-origin group identities (Taylor et al. 2012), here we focus on pan-ethnic and national identities exclusively for several reasons: pan-ethnic identities are more likely to be targeted by political campaigns for mobilization; no similar process of politicization has been documented for Latinos' national-origin identities; and there are practical limitations in our ability to infer, a priori, the national origin of Latinos using publicly available data. In the remainder of the article we use the terms "pan-ethnic" and "ethnic" interchangeably.

**TABLE 1. Theoretical Expectations about Status and Latino Identities**

|   | Ethnic identity  | National identity |
|---|--|-------------------|
| Low individual status/low community resources   | STRONG   | WEAK              |
| High individual status/high community resources | if % Latino is large: STRONG<br>if % Latino is small: WEAK | STRONG            |

enhanced sense of societal integration and political efficacy, all of which make the adoption of a strong national identity more likely (Golash-Boza 2006; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Schildkraut 2011; Taylor et al. 2012). Similarly, high-resource communities tend to promote feelings of well-being and inclusion that may foster identification with a broader American community.<sup>5</sup>

However, the relationship between high status, resources, and *ethnic* identification is more complicated. First, processes that promote national identification among high-status individuals and communities do not necessarily undermine ethnic attachments, so we should not assume that strong national identities imply weak ethnic identities. Second, social group identification is not a zero-sum game. Individuals can and do hold multiple strong identities, often negotiating between them in response to different contexts and personal experiences (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; García Bedolla 2005; Golash-Boza 2006; Masuoka 2006; Nagel 1994; Padilla 1985; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Schildkraut 2011). Thus, the strength of ethnic identification among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities will depend on whether other factors are working to sustain or undermine that identity.

Prior research suggests that Latino population concentration is one such critical factor. Studies have shown that larger in-group populations increase the salience of group membership (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Brewer and Miller 1984; Lau 1989), foster a sense of group empowerment and political efficacy (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; García Bedolla 2005), and promote stronger racial and ethnic identities and feelings of linked fate (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Gay 2004; Lau 1989; Pulido and Pastor 2013; Valenzuela 2011). For Latinos specifically, larger Latino population proportions are likely to be correlated with more extensive co-ethnic social networks, reliance on Spanish-language communication and business transactions, and greater ethnic media exposure (both political and nonpolitical), which help create, reinforce, and politicize ethnic identity attachments. Thus, we expect Latinos in high-resource communities with large Latino populations to hold strong ethnic identities alongside strong national identities. In contrast, Latinos in high-resource communities with small Latino populations should hold

weak ethnic identities.<sup>6</sup> We summarize our expectations about the link between status, resources, and the strength of ethnic and national identities among Latinos in Table 1.

If our hypotheses are correct, then we should see ethnic identity appeals increase turnout among low-status Latinos and in low-resource communities, and among high-status Latinos and in high-resource communities *where Latinos represent a large share of the population*. Conversely, we should see that national identity appeals are effective only among high-status Latinos and in high-resource communities.

To measure community-level resources, we used data on median household income from the 2000 U.S. Census.<sup>7</sup> To measure individual-level status, we used indicators of acculturation and political incorporation. Following previous research (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Panagopoulos 2011; Branton 2007; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2008), we defined low-acculturation (low-status) Latinos as foreign born<sup>8</sup> and Spanish speaking, and high-acculturation (high-status) Latinos as U.S. born and English speaking. In California, nativity data are available in the voter file, allowing us to use nativity as our measure of acculturation. The Texas data file does not include information on nativity, so in our replication we instead used data collected during the experiment about the voter's preferred language.<sup>9</sup> We defined low political-incorporation Latinos as those registered to vote for less than five years, and high-incorporation Latinos as those registered to vote for five years or more. Our outcome measure was validated turnout among Latinos treated in our experiments, data that we purchased from election officials. By using readily available information as a proxy for status and resources, our research design makes a methodological and practical contribution to the experimental study of voter turnout.

<sup>6</sup> A selection process may also account for weak ethnic identities in low-Latino-population communities if Latinos who already possess weak ethnic identities are more likely to choose to live in these communities.

<sup>7</sup> Economic data from the 2010 U.S. Census were not available at the time of our study.

<sup>8</sup> We count Latinos not born in the United States or Puerto Rico as foreign born.

<sup>9</sup> Survey data from 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006) show that language use and nativity are highly correlated among Texas Latinos ( $r = 0.69$ ). Given the lack of official nativity data in Texas and the high correlation between language use and nativity in the state, we assumed that nativity in the California data and language use in Texas are equivalent measures of acculturation (status), while acknowledging that nativity is likely a more accurate proxy than is language use.

<sup>5</sup> Although some Latinos may assume that "American" means "white" (Devos and Banaji 2005), a strong national identity is still widely held among U.S. Latinos (Fraga et al. 2006).



## Study Contexts

We tested our hypotheses using two placebo-controlled nonpartisan GOTV field experiments conducted on Latino-surname registered voters in Los Angeles County, California, and Hidalgo County, Texas. Within each county, we purposefully selected adjacent communities with super-majority Latino populations that varied significantly in median household incomes. This variation in community-level resources was crucial to testing our expectations about differences in responsiveness to ethnic and national identity appeals depending on the strength of these group identities (Hypotheses 1b and 2b). Moreover, by choosing adjacent communities within the same county we limited differences in culture, issues, and candidates featured in the elections that might have influenced Latino turnout. We conducted our first experiment in the 2010 California primary election and then replicated our design in the 2012 Texas primary election to confirm that our results were not the product of some idiosyncratic feature of California politics. We chose primary election contests because low-salience elections maximize the visibility and potential impact of our GOTV treatments.<sup>10</sup>

In both California and Texas, we chose study contexts in which the Latino population was primarily of Mexican origin, a design feature we used to isolate the effects of differences in community resources. We decided to hold national-origin heterogeneity constant because it may weaken ethnic identification. Although direct evidence is lacking for Latinos, prior work on African Americans indicates weaker racial attachments in mixed neighborhoods, compared to in predominantly black neighborhoods (Bledsoe et al. 1995; Lau 1989), suggesting that Latinos in more heterogeneous environments will exhibit less group cohesion than Latinos in more homogeneous environments. At minimum, group identification and intragroup relations are complicated by the significant presence of multiple Latino subgroups in a local community.<sup>11</sup>

In California, we conducted the experiment in East Los Angeles (low resources) and Montebello (high resources), immediately adjacent communities with super-majority Latino populations that vary significantly by median household income.<sup>12</sup> The California primary in 2010 featured several Latinos running

for office, but they were mostly unopposed candidates seeking reelection. One exception was John Noguez, who ran for county assessor in a field of 12 candidates; his eventual victory marked the first time a Latino had ever been elected to this post.

In Texas, we conducted the experiment in three communities: San Juan (low resources), Edinburg (medium resources), and McAllen (high resources).<sup>13</sup> As in California, these are super-majority Latino communities that are predominantly of Mexican origin with sizable foreign-born populations.<sup>14</sup> Much like in the 2010 California primary, several Latino candidates appeared on the ballot in Texas, but most for reelection or in uncontested races. One exception was the Republican primary for U.S. Senate, which featured David Dewhurst and Ted Cruz and was the subject of considerable media coverage. However, because most Latinos are Democrats (especially in Hidalgo County, which voted 70% for President Obama in 2012), this race was not of great relevance to the voters in our experiment. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all of our study contexts and the U.S. overall.

One limitation of our choice of study contexts is that because they are all Latino-majority areas, we could not fully test whether the effects of ethnic identity appeals for high-status individuals and in high-resource communities are conditional on the share of the population that is Latino. To do this, we would have needed to run our experiment in contrasting communities with small Latino population shares. Practically speaking, however, the need to contact a large sample of Latino voters in these communities using finite resources and in the short GOTV window before the election made a reliable test highly uncertain and ultimately infeasible. We therefore cannot observe whether, as our theory predicts, ethnic appeals have weak or insignificant effects on turnout among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities where Latinos are in the minority.

## Experimental Design and Analysis

In both experiments we relied on placebo-controlled designs to estimate treatment effects of our interventions among those who were successfully contacted. We chose this approach because we expected high non-compliance within our subject pools, which would lead to large standard errors and reduced power to detect

<sup>10</sup> High-salience general elections attract significant campaign spending and media attention (Cox and Munger 1989), which saturate voters with campaign appeals, thereby making low-salience primary elections a more fruitful context for tests of GOTV experimental interventions (Green and Gerber 2008). In addition, although Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) found that frequent voters are more likely to respond to GOTV contact in low-salience elections, and infrequent voters are more likely to respond to GOTV contact in high-salience elections, our theory is agnostic about the impact of election salience on the effects of identity-based GOTV appeals.

<sup>11</sup> To the extent that ethnic identification is strong in homogeneous communities and weak in heterogeneous ones, our theory predicts that ethnic identity appeals will have a positive effect in the former but not in the latter. We leave testing this possibility to future research.

<sup>12</sup> Census records from 2000 indicate that East Los Angeles, an unincorporated area of the county, is about 97% Latino (87% of whom are of Mexican origin) and 49% foreign born (27% of whom are nat-

uralized citizens), with a median household income of about \$28,500. In contrast, its next-door neighbor—the city of Montebello—is about 75% Latino (84% of Mexican origin) and 38% foreign born (47% of whom are naturalized citizens), with a median household income of about \$38,800.

<sup>13</sup> However, because there were too few contacts in the low-resource community, in the following analyses we combined low- and medium-resource communities in Texas, analyzing them together as low resource (see the Supplementary Online Appendix for more details).

<sup>14</sup> Census records from 2000 indicate that San Juan is about 95% Latino (89% of Mexican origin) and 34% foreign born (9% of whom are naturalized citizens), with a median household income of \$22,706. Edinburg is 89% Latino (81% of Mexican origin) and 22% foreign born (7% of whom are naturalized citizens), with a median household income of \$28,938. McAllen is 80% Latino (82% of Mexican origin) and 28% foreign born (10% of whom are naturalized citizens), with a median household income of \$33,641.

**TABLE 2. Select Characteristics of the U.S. Latino Population and Study Contexts**

|                                      | United States | Los Angeles County,<br>California |                  | Hidalgo County, Texas |                |               |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------|---------------|
|                                      |               | East L.A.<br>CA                   | Montebello<br>CA | San Juan<br>TX        | Edinburg<br>TX | McAllen<br>TX |
| Median age                           | 36.9          | 28.7                              | 34.7             | 25.9                  | 28.0           | 31.4          |
| % Latino                             | 15.7          | 95.9                              | 78.6             | 88.4                  | 87.6           | 82.9          |
| % Foreign born (Latino)              | 38.2          | 44.7                              | 35.7             | 32.6                  | 19.3           | 31.3          |
| % Naturalized citizen (foreign born) | 43.0          | 28.7                              | 50.1             | 26.3                  | 30.2           | 34.1          |
| % Speak Spanish at home              | 12.5          | 88.3                              | 61.3             | 91.3                  | 74.3           | 75.6          |
| % Households with children under 18  | 33.9          | 54.7                              | 43.4             | 59.1                  | 51.3           | 46.2          |
| % High school degree or higher       | 84.2          | 44.3                              | 69.3             | 52.8                  | 72.4           | 73.6          |
| % Bachelor's degree or higher        | 27.3          | 5.4                               | 16.4             | 9.2                   | 20.6           | 27.5          |
| Median household income (\$)         | 51,914        | 37,128                            | 50,881           | 30,766                | 37,176         | 39,547        |
| Per capita income (\$)               | 27,334        | 12,633                            | 20,373           | 10,832                | 15,542         | 19,490        |

Sources: 2006–2010 American Community Survey and 2010 Census, factfinder2.census.gov.

treatment effects (Gerber and Green 2012; Nickerson 2005). The placebo conditions overcame this problem by providing appropriate baseline voting rates to which voting rates in the treatment conditions could be compared (see Nickerson 2005, 244). This design allowed us to calculate complier average causal effects (CACE) of our identity appeals by comparing turnout rates among those in the placebo condition who successfully received the placebo message to turnout rates among those in the treatment conditions who were successfully treated with identity appeals.<sup>15</sup>

Latinos within each of our study contexts were randomized to receive either a placebo recycling encouragement, an ethnic identity GOTV appeal, or a national identity GOTV appeal. All treatment and placebo messages were delivered in English or Spanish, as preferred by the contacted voter, using a live telephone bank. Local students were trained to deliver the messages in a conversational manner, and all calls were made under the supervision of one of the authors and a research assistant, procedures that have been shown to increase the effectiveness of GOTV calls (Nickerson 2007). The callers identified themselves as part of the Waste Recycling Project, a local campaign encouraging recycling (placebo message); the Latino (Hispanic) Voter Project, a local campaign encouraging greater turnout among Latino (Hispanic) citizens (ethnic identity appeals); or the American Voter Project, a local campaign encouraging greater turnout among U.S. citizens (national identity appeal).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Complier average causal effects (CACE) are average treatment effects of our GOTV messages (compared to the placebo message) among “compliers”: subjects who were successfully treated (either with a GOTV message or a placebo message). Although our analysis of average treatment effects among compliers is now standard practice (see Gerber and Green 2012 and Nickerson 2005), it is one of the first times this approach has been applied successfully to racial and ethnic minorities.

<sup>16</sup> The exact wording of all experimental messages can be found in the Supplementary Online Appendix.

In California, the ethnic identity messages used the word “Latino,” whereas in Texas the ethnic identity messages used “Hispanic,” reflecting local preferences.<sup>17</sup> After the subject received a call from the telephone bank, a reminder with the original message was delivered to all contacted voters, another tactic previously shown to increase the effectiveness of GOTV calls (Michelson, García Bedolla, and McConnell 2009). In California, the reminders were bilingual postcards sent to contacted voters less than a week before the election. In Texas, the reminders were pre-recorded telephone calls made the evening before the election in the contacted voters’ preferred language.

To test our expectations about the effects of ethnic and national identity appeals in high- and low-resource communities, we calculated CACE separately for our low-resource communities (East Los Angeles in the California experiment; San Juan and Edinburg in the Texas experiment) and for our high-resource communities (Montebello in California and McAllen in Texas). We expected that ethnic identity appeals would have positive effects on turnout in both the low- and high-resource communities because of their supermajority Latino population proportions. We expected that national identity appeals would have a positive effect on turnout only in the high-resource communities.

To test our expectations about the effects of these appeals among high- and low-status individuals, we pooled subjects within each experiment and calculated CACE separately for Latinos with high acculturation and high political incorporation (i.e., high status) and for Latinos with low acculturation and low political incorporation (i.e., low status). We expected that national identity appeals would increase turnout among the high-acculturation and high-political-incorporation subgroups but not among the

<sup>17</sup> Survey data from 2006 (Fraga et al. 2006) show that Latinos in California are more likely to prefer “Latino” ( $p < 0.001$ ), whereas those in Texas are more likely to prefer “Hispanic” ( $p = 0.10$ ), in models controlling for income, education, acculturation, and state of residence.



low-acculturation and low-political-incorporation subgroups. We expected ethnic identity appeals to increase turnout among all of our subgroups.

## RESULTS

After each election we purchased validated turnout data from the relevant county registrars and, for each experiment, calculated complier average causal effects (CACE) of our GOTV treatments by taking the difference in turnout rates between successfully contacted voters in the treatment and placebo groups. Table 3 presents our results for both the California experiment and the Texas replication.<sup>18</sup>

Looking first at California, we found that the ethnic identity appeal successfully mobilized turnout at greater rates than a placebo message in both the high-resource community (Montebello) and the low-resource community (East Los Angeles). In Montebello, turnout was 7.3 percentage points higher in the ethnic appeal condition than in the placebo condition (from 12.5% to 19.8%). In East Los Angeles, turnout was 6.2 percentage points higher in the ethnic appeal condition than in the placebo condition (from 17.7% to 23.9%). The ethnic identity appeals also had significant effects on both low- and high-status individuals. Latinos with low acculturation (foreign born) and low political incorporation (recently registered to vote) were, respectively, 9.5 percentage points and 8.4 percentage points more likely to vote after hearing the ethnic identity appeal as opposed to the placebo message. Similarly, Latinos with high acculturation (native born) were 6.0 percentage points more likely to vote in response to the ethnic identity appeal than the placebo message. Although CACE for the ethnic identity appeal among high-political-incorporation (registered to vote for 5+ years) Latinos were not statistically significant, the effects were in the expected direction and thus did not change the overall pattern of our results.

In contrast, the effects of the national identity appeals in California were conditional on individual status and community resources. The national identity appeals increased turnout only in the high-resource community and only among high-status Latinos. In high-resource Montebello, the national identity appeals increased turnout by 7.5 percentage points over the placebo messages (from 12.5% to 20%), whereas in low-resource East Los Angeles, that effect was an insignificant 1.3 percentage points. This pattern was mirrored among high- and low-status individuals. For Latinos with high acculturation and high political incorporation, turnout among those who received the national identity appeal was, respectively, 6.3 and 9.7

percentage points higher than in the placebo group, whereas among Latinos with low acculturation and low political incorporation, the national appeal had no greater effect than the placebo message.

Our results in California offer strong support for our theory. According to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, ethnic identity GOTV appeals should increase turnout only among individuals and communities with strong ethnic attachments. In the Latino super-majority areas in which we conducted our study, we expected both individuals and communities to have strong ethnic attachments regardless of their status and resources, and indeed, we found that ethnic identity GOTV appeals produced large increases in turnout in all of our subgroups despite the differences in their status and resources.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict that national identity appeals will increase turnout only among individuals and communities with strong national identities. In our study contexts, we expected the strength of national identification to vary depending on individual status and community resources, with higher status and resources indicating stronger national attachments. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that national identity GOTV appeals mobilized greater turnout only for high-status individuals and high-resource communities in our super-majority Latino contexts.

Turning to the Texas replication, the results of our ethnic identity appeals largely confirmed the findings of the California experiment, with positive and significant effects obtained across the board except in high-resource McAllen. In low-resource San Juan and Edinburg, the ethnic identity appeals increased turnout by 9.6 percentage points; among Latinos with low acculturation (Spanish speakers) and low political incorporation (recently registered) the ethnic appeal increased turnout by 12.6 and 9.4 percentage points, respectively; and among Latinos with high political incorporation (registered more than five years) the ethnic identity appeal increased turnout by 5.0 percentage points. Although in the expected direction, there was no significant effect of the ethnic identity appeal among Latinos with high acculturation (English speakers) in Texas.

For the national identity appeal, the results of our Texas experiment presented more of a puzzle. As in California, we expected to find that the national identity appeal increased turnout among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities. Instead, we found null results across the board, with the exception of low-acculturation individuals for whom the effect on turnout was unexpectedly positive. Why might national identity appeals be less effective among high-status individuals and high-resource communities in Texas as compared to California?

One possibility is a ceiling effect: baseline turnout rates were substantially higher among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities in Texas than they were in California, so perhaps there was less room for an increase in response to GOTV appeals in a primary election. However, this explanation seems to be ruled out by the fact that the ethnic identity appeals successfully mobilized high- and low-status individu-

<sup>18</sup> In addition to calculating mean differences in turnout between treatment and placebo conditions to estimate complier average causal effects (CACE) of our GOTV messages, we specified and ran regression models of individual turnout on treatment indicator variables, first alone to verify the mean differences (which were confirmed in every case) and then with individual- and contextual-level covariates. Shown in the Appendix, the results are substantively similar to those obtained by examining mean differences.

**TABLE 3. Turnout Rates and Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE)**

|                                  | (1) Recycle<br>Baseline<br>Turnout (%) | (2) National<br>Identity<br>Turnout (%) | (3) National<br>Identity<br>CACE (% pts.) | (4) Ethnic<br>Identity<br>Turnout (%) | (5) Ethnic<br>Identity<br>CACE (% pts.) |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| <b>A. California</b>             |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| <i>Community resources</i>       |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| High resource (Montebello)       | 12.5                                   | 20.0                                    | 7.5*                                      | 19.8                                  | 7.3*                                    |
| Low resource (East L.A.)         | 17.7                                   | 19.0                                    | 1.3                                       | 23.9                                  | 6.2*                                    |
| <i>Individual status</i>         |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| High acculturation               | 13.0                                   | 19.3                                    | 6.3*                                      | 19.0                                  | 6.0*                                    |
| High political incorporation     | 18.0                                   | 27.7                                    | 9.7*                                      | 23.6                                  | 5.6                                     |
| Low acculturation                | 20.0                                   | 20.0                                    | 0   | 29.5                                  | 9.5*                                    |
| Low political incorporation      | 11.6                                   | 12.6                                    | 1.0                                       | 20.0                                  | 8.4*                                    |
| <b>B. Texas</b>                  |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| <i>Community resources</i>       |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| High resource (McAllen)          | 29.3                                   | 28.6                                    | -0.7                                      | 30.0                                  | 0.7                                     |
| Low resource (San Juan/Edinburg) | 31.8                                   | 36.3                                    | 4.5                                       | 41.4                                  | 9.6*                                    |
| <i>Individual status</i>         |  |   |   |                                       |   |
| High acculturation               | 32.1                                   | 30.1                                    | -2.0                                      | 32.6                                  | 0.5                                     |
| High political incorporation     | 32.9                                   | 34.2                                    | 1.3                                       | 37.9                                  | 5.0*                                    |
| Low acculturation                | 28.3                                   | 35.5                                    | 7.3*                                      | 40.9                                  | 12.6*                                   |
| Low political incorporation      | 20.3                                   | 23.4                                    | 3.1                                       | 29.7                                  | 9.4*                                    |

Notes: Acculturation in California is defined using nativity, where less acculturated = foreign born, and more acculturated = native born; acculturation in Texas is defined using language preference, where less acculturated = Spanish speakers, and more acculturated = English speakers. Starred entries indicate significant mean differences in turnout between identity treatment and baseline conditions.

als in high- and low-resource communities in Texas, for whom baseline turnout rates were also high. Thus higher baseline turnout rates among high-status individuals and high-resource communities in Texas cannot alone explain why the national identity appeals were ineffective.

Another possibility points to the proximity of our community contexts in Hidalgo County, Texas, to the U.S.-Mexico border, which is just 15 miles away. These study contexts may be distinct from those in California because of the availability of an alternative superordinate identity for high-status individuals and those in high-resource communities. As others have argued, daily life in this part of Texas within the Rio Grande Valley, as in other borderland regions, is marked by close-knit social networks that span the international border, regular border crossings for personal and business purposes, and the prevalence of Mexican cultural markers and other explicit ties to Mexico (Cadava 2013; Jiménez 2010). Proximity to the border thus serves to make *Mexican* identity highly salient, and this effect may be more likely among high-status Latinos with the means and resources needed to maintain close ties to the cross-border Mexican community.<sup>19</sup> Thus, high-status individuals and those in high-resource communities in this part of Texas may hold strong Mexican-origin identities rather than strong American identities. If this were indeed the case, our theory predicts that a Mexican identity appeal, rather than a national identity appeal, would effectively increase turnout among high-

status individuals and in high-resource communities here and in other areas along the U.S.-Mexico border.<sup>20</sup>

Proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border may also help explain why the ethnic identity appeal was ineffective in high-resource McAllen, contrary to our expectations. Given its close proximity to the border, its large foreign-born population, and relatively low rates of naturalization, a pan-ethnic Latino identity in this community may have become stigmatized and viewed as an identity only suitable for less acculturated immigrants. If this is the case, then high-status individuals and high resource communities will be less likely to develop and maintain strong pan-ethnic attachments, making pan-ethnic identity appeals, as we observed in our study, ineffective.

## CONCLUSION

Overall, the results from our California experiment provide strong and compelling support for our theory, whereas the results from our Texas replication introduce some nuances that suggest important avenues for future research. In contrast to the existing GOTV literature on targeting racial and

<sup>19</sup> For example, there is a fee associated with crossing the international border in Hidalgo, Texas. See [https://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/iro/2013\\_international\\_bridges.pdf](https://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/iro/2013_international_bridges.pdf) (accessed November 23, 2015).

<sup>20</sup> Another possibility is that Texas has a particularly strong state-based identity, and high-status individuals and those in high-resource communities in Texas may adopt a superordinate state identity rather than a national one. Extant research has not tested whether and to what extent state-based identities are relevant to voting, although some work has explored the role of rural identity in political preferences (Cramer Walsh 2012). If state-based identities are politicized in Texas or elsewhere, our theory predicts that GOTV appeals to these identities will effectively mobilize individuals and communities with strong state identities. Testing the effectiveness of state and national-origin identity GOTV appeals represent potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

ethnic group members with identity cues, we find that identity appeals can have a powerful impact on turnout, provided they are targeted at the appropriate individuals and communities. Using readily available indicators of individual-level status and community resources as proxies for differences in the strength of ethnic and national identity attachments, we showed that identity strength is a key moderator of responsiveness to GOTV identity appeals.

Among low-status Latino individuals and in low-resource communities, where ethnic attachments tend to be strong and national attachments weak, ethnic identity appeals were consistently effective, whereas national identity appeals were not. This evidence suggests an important moderating role for ethnic identity strength in the voting behavior of Latinos and their responsiveness to targeted identity appeals, an insight that future researchers and campaigns interested in mobilizing Latinos to vote should take into account when designing their outreach.

Among high-status individuals and in high-resource communities in the Latino-majority areas where we conducted our studies, both national and ethnic identification are likely to be strong, and our California results were highly consistent with that expectation, showing that both ethnic and national identity appeals were effective in increasing Latino turnout. At the same time, our Texas results suggest that the connection between status, resources, and national identity is more complicated in the presence of other potential superordinate identities. In certain contexts, such as along the U.S.-Mexico border, national-*origin* identity can become politicized and may supplant an American identity as the salient superordinate identity. Additional research on the complex interplay between pan-ethnic, national-origin and American identities within the Latino community and in different contexts will help clarify which segments of the population are most likely to be responsive to identity-based GOTV appeals.

Although we focused our experiments on turnout and mobilization strategies among Latinos in majority-Latino areas, reflecting the increasing political importance of the growing Latino population, our theoretical framework may be applied to other social identity groups with members who vary in their degree of attachment to their group, including other ethnoracial groups, members of religious faiths, or other social groups with status hierarchies. Our theory and results suggest that for individuals who are low in status and live in low-resource communities, appeals to their low-status subgroup identity will be more effective than general appeals to a mainstream or superordinate identity. Our study extends lines of research on social identity in politics (e.g., Huddy 2001) by developing and testing a theory about how the strength of group identification is related to status, resources, and their interaction with targeted identity appeals.

Our results demonstrate that status and resources are effective proxies for ethnic and national identity strength, moderating the causal effects of GOTV identity appeals on group members' propensity to vote.

Micro-targeting using identity appeals works when the right message reaches the right voter. Attentiveness to community context and individual status can enhance the effectiveness of targeted GOTV contact aimed at increasing turnout among ethnic and racial minorities by ensuring that identity messages reach those for whom they will be most salient. For Latino voters, we have provided the first compelling evidence that ethnic identity GOTV appeals can be effective in increasing turnout.

The findings we report are theoretically consistent with other work on Latino turnout, in contrast to previous null results from GOTV studies with embedded identity content. Why did our experiments find differences in message effects, whereas others have not? One reason is that the San Joaquin Valley in California (Michelson 2003, 2005), or Brownsville, Texas (Matland and Murray 2012), where previous studies were conducted, may be different from Los Angeles and Hidalgo Counties. Although all of these experiments were conducted in majority-Latino communities, the research designs did not distinguish between high- and low-status individuals or high- and low-resource communities, potentially masking varied effects of the GOTV appeals depending on the strength of identity attachments. This again reminds us of the necessity of disaggregating the Latino community, rather than treating Latinos as an undifferentiated voting bloc.

In addition, the previous experiments were all conducted some time ago—in 2001, 2002, and 2004—before the recent wave of immigrant protests and mobilization activity in 2006 and later (Barreto et al. 2009; Barreto and Segura 2014; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2014). It is likely that the politicization of Latino ethnic identity is greater now than in the prior political climate, and our theory of expressive voting and responsiveness to GOTV identity appeals explains why this more limited politicization would lead to limited effects of an ethnic identity appeal in prior GOTV work.

Ultimately, our theory and approach provide scholars and practitioners with new insights about how and whom to target with GOTV identity appeals. By using status and community resources as proxies for the strength of group identities, researchers are now in a position to test the effects of subgroup and superordinate group appeals on precisely those who are most likely to respond to these identity appeals through a process of expressive voting: those with strong and politicized group attachments. Although future research should test whether Latino identity appeals are effective in contexts different from ours—for example, in areas with smaller Latino populations or where the internal diversity of the Latino community is greater—the theory we developed here generates expectations about whether ethnic identity appeals will be effective in these other contexts. The bottom line is that not all Latinos are equally responsive to the same GOTV identity appeals, and this heterogeneity must be understood and taken into account if political practitioners and scholars are interested in which strategies best mobilize Latinos to vote.



## APPENDIX A

TABLE A1. Regression Results for California

|  | Low-Status Subgroups |                  |                        | High-Status Subgroups |                  |                  |
|--|----------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|
|  | Low SES<br>comm.     | Foreign<br>born  | Recently<br>registered | High SES<br>comm.     | U.S.<br>born     | Reg. 5+<br>years |
| National identity GOTV                       | 0.01<br>(0.04)       | -0.02<br>(0.05)  | 0.01<br>(0.03)         | 0.07*<br>(0.03)       | 0.07*<br>(0.03)  | 0.08*<br>(0.04)  |
| Ethnic identity GOTV                         | 0.07+<br>(0.04)      | 0.08<br>(0.06)   | 0.08*<br>(0.03)        | 0.05+<br>(0.03)       | 0.06*<br>(0.03)  | 0.05<br>(0.04)   |
| Low resource community                       | -                    | 0.07<br>(0.06)   | 0.03<br>(0.03)         | -                     | -0.03<br>(0.03)  | -0.05<br>(0.05)  |
| Foreign born                                 | -0.00<br>(0.04)      | -                | -0.06<br>(0.03)        | -0.03<br>(0.04)       | -                | 0.00<br>(0.05)   |
| Recently registered                          | -0.02<br>(0.04)      | -0.05<br>(0.05)  | -                      | 0.01<br>(0.03)        | -0.01<br>(0.03)  | -                |
| Live contact                                 | 0.08*<br>(0.03)      | 0.06<br>(0.04)   | 0.05+<br>(0.03)        | 0.03<br>(0.03)        | 0.05+<br>(0.03)  | 0.05<br>(0.04)   |
| Voted in 2008                                | 0.14**<br>(0.03)     | 0.15**<br>(0.05) | 0.11**<br>(0.02)       | 0.15**<br>(0.02)      | 0.15**<br>(0.02) | 0.20**<br>(0.03) |
| Age  | 0.43**<br>(0.09)     | 0.39**<br>(0.12) | 0.52**<br>(0.09)       | 0.49**<br>(0.08)      | 0.50**<br>(0.07) | 0.46**<br>(0.08) |
| Female                                       | 0.01<br>(0.03)       | -0.02<br>(0.04)  | 0.00<br>(0.02)         | 0.01<br>(0.03)        | 0.02<br>(0.02)   | 0.02<br>(0.03)   |
| Voters in household (HH)                     | -0.05<br>(0.09)      | 0.01<br>(0.16)   | 0.02<br>(0.08)         | -0.01<br>(0.10)       | -0.02<br>(0.07)  | -0.06<br>(0.10)  |
| Republican                                   | -0.04<br>(0.04)      | 0.00<br>(0.07)   | -0.04<br>(0.03)        | 0.01<br>(0.03)        | -0.02<br>(0.03)  | 0.02<br>(0.05)   |
| Decline-to-state                             | -0.03<br>(0.04)      | -0.03<br>(0.06)  | -0.04<br>(0.03)        | -0.00<br>(0.04)       | -0.01<br>(0.03)  | 0.01<br>(0.05)   |
| Other party                                  | -0.01<br>(0.08)      | 0.21<br>(0.25)   | -0.09<br>(0.06)        | -0.06<br>(0.05)       | -0.06<br>(0.04)  | 0.01<br>(0.07)   |
| 2010 Block-group (BG) population size        | -0.10<br>(0.19)      | -0.10<br>(0.29)  | -0.25<br>(0.16)        | -0.00<br>(0.19)       | -0.05<br>(0.14)  | 0.17<br>(0.22)   |
| 2000 BG Median HH income                     | 0.04<br>(0.36)       | -0.22<br>(0.35)  | -0.06<br>(0.20)        | -0.26<br>(0.19)       | -0.13<br>(0.19)  | -0.30<br>(0.27)  |
| 2010 BG % Hispanic                           | 0.67*<br>(0.33)      | -0.69*<br>(0.30) | -0.22<br>(0.19)        | -0.50**<br>(0.17)     | -0.19<br>(0.15)  | -0.46*<br>(0.21) |
| 2000 BG % foreign born                       | -0.04<br>(0.44)      | -0.57<br>(0.48)  | -0.26<br>(0.29)        | -0.12<br>(0.28)       | 0.11<br>(0.25)   | 0.03<br>(0.37)   |
| 2000 BG % foreign born noncitizen            | -0.02<br>(0.36)      | 0.30<br>(0.54)   | 0.07<br>(0.28)         | -0.04<br>(0.31)       | -0.21<br>(0.24)  | -0.23<br>(0.36)  |
| 2000 BG % bachelor's degree— female Hispanic | -0.51<br>(1.20)      | -1.64<br>(1.30)  | -1.11+<br>(0.59)       | -1.00<br>(0.70)       | -0.78<br>(0.58)  | -1.10<br>(1.13)  |
| 2000 BG % bachelor's degree— male Hispanic   | 0.55<br>(0.64)       | -1.39<br>(0.87)  | -0.24<br>(0.41)        | -1.15*<br>(0.45)      | -0.34<br>(0.37)  | -1.00<br>(0.61)  |
| Constant                                     | -0.69*<br>(0.30)     | 0.90*<br>(0.44)  | 0.33<br>(0.25)         | 0.52*<br>(0.24)       | 0.17<br>(0.22)   | 0.47<br>(0.31)   |
| Observations                                 | 653                  | 384              | 748                    | 767                   | 1036             | 672              |
| r <sup>2</sup>                               | 0.12                 | 0.11             | 0.13                   | 0.14                  | 0.13             | 0.12             |
| Log-likelihood ratio                         | -291.83              | -190.45          | -232.34                | -282.36               | -381.97          | -330.90          |
| AIC  | 623.67               | 420.90           | 504.68                 | 604.73                | 803.93           | 701.79           |

+  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses.

**TABLE A2. Regression Results for Texas**

|   | <i>Low-Status Subgroups</i> |                            |                               | <i>High-Status Subgroups</i> |                            |                         |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
|   | (1)<br>Low<br>SES comm.     | (2)<br>Spanish<br>speakers | (3)<br>Recently<br>registered | (4)<br>High<br>SES comm.     | (5)<br>English<br>speakers | (6)<br>Reg. 5+<br>years |
| National identity GOTV                      | 0.03<br>(0.03)              | 0.05<br>(0.03)             | 0.05<br>(0.05)                | -0.02<br>(0.03)              | -0.03<br>(0.03)            | -0.01<br>(0.02)         |
| Ethnic identity GOTV                        | 0.05<br>(0.03)              | 0.07*<br>(0.03)            | 0.08+<br>(0.05)               | -0.02<br>(0.03)              | -0.02<br>(0.03)            | 0.00<br>(0.02)          |
| Low resource community                      | -                           | 0.15**<br>(0.04)           | 0.13*<br>(0.06)               | -                            | -0.11**<br>(0.03)          | -0.13**<br>(0.03)       |
| English speakers                            | -0.03<br>(0.03)             | -                          | -0.08+<br>(0.04)              | -0.04<br>(0.03)              | -                          | -0.03<br>(0.02)         |
| Recently registered                         | 0.06+<br>(0.03)             | 0.11**<br>(0.04)           | -                             | -0.04<br>(0.03)              | -0.00<br>(0.03)            | -                       |
| Voted in 2008                               | 0.08**<br>(0.03)            | 0.08*<br>(0.03)            | -0.01<br>(0.05)               | 0.08**<br>(0.02)             | 0.07*<br>(0.03)            | 0.10**<br>(0.02)        |
| Voted in 2010                               | 0.36**<br>(0.03)            | 0.38**<br>(0.03)           | 0.32**<br>(0.06)              | 0.38**<br>(0.03)             | 0.37**<br>(0.03)           | 0.37**<br>(0.02)        |
| Married                                     | 0.00<br>(0.03)              | 0.00<br>(0.03)             | -0.10*<br>(0.04)              | 0.00<br>(0.02)               | 0.00<br>(0.02)             | 0.03<br>(0.02)          |
| Age   | 0.31**<br>(0.07)            | 0.22**<br>(0.07)           | 0.28**<br>(0.09)              | 0.19**<br>(0.06)             | 0.22**<br>(0.06)           | 0.26**<br>(0.05)        |
| Female                                      | -0.00<br>(0.03)             | 0.01<br>(0.03)             | -0.00<br>(0.04)               | 0.00<br>(0.02)               | -0.01<br>(0.02)            | 0.00<br>(0.02)          |
| Log (partisanship score)                    | 0.13**<br>(0.05)            | 0.31**<br>(0.06)           | 0.14*<br>(0.06)               | 0.03<br>(0.04)               | 0.03<br>(0.03)             | 0.05<br>(0.03)          |
| Robo call: live                             | 0.00<br>(0.05)              | 0.01<br>(0.05)             | 0.01<br>(0.08)                | 0.03<br>(0.05)               | 0.02<br>(0.04)             | 0.02<br>(0.04)          |
| Robo call: voicemail                        | -0.02<br>(0.06)             | 0.01<br>(0.07)             | 0.00<br>(0.10)                | 0.01<br>(0.06)               | -0.00<br>(0.06)            | -0.00<br>(0.05)         |
| Robo call duration                          | 0.02<br>(0.03)              | -0.00<br>(0.03)            | 0.01<br>(0.05)                | -0.01<br>(0.03)              | 0.00<br>(0.03)             | 0.01<br>(0.02)          |
| 2010 BG pop. size                           | -0.00<br>(0.06)             | -0.10<br>(0.07)            | -0.02<br>(0.09)               | -0.07<br>(0.07)              | 0.02<br>(0.05)             | -0.02<br>(0.05)         |
| 2010 BG % Hispanic                          | -0.11<br>(0.44)             | 0.06<br>(0.34)             | -0.08<br>(0.50)               | 0.16<br>(0.23)               | -0.02<br>(0.26)            | 0.09<br>(0.22)          |
| 2000 BG Median HH income                    | 0.06<br>(0.16)              | 0.08<br>(0.15)             | 0.13<br>(0.22)                | -0.07<br>(0.11)              | -0.07<br>(0.11)            | -0.03<br>(0.10)         |
| 2000 BG % foreign born                      | 0.53<br>(0.49)              | 1.23**<br>(0.41)           | 1.63*<br>(0.66)               | 0.75*<br>(0.36)              | 0.04<br>(0.39)             | 0.62*<br>(0.31)         |
| 2000 BG % foreign-born noncitizen           | -0.48<br>(0.51)             | -1.32**<br>(0.44)          | -1.21<br>(0.74)               | -0.71+<br>(0.39)             | 0.11<br>(0.41)             | -0.63+<br>(0.33)        |
| 2000 BG % bachelor's degree-female Hispanic | -0.61<br>(0.79)             | 0.25<br>(0.66)             | 0.98<br>(0.91)                | 0.51<br>(0.48)               | -0.06<br>(0.48)            | 0.03<br>(0.43)          |
| 2000 BG % Bachelor's degree-male Hispanic   | 0.71<br>(0.81)              | 0.04<br>(0.66)             | -0.81<br>(0.95)               | 0.02<br>(0.50)               | 0.46<br>(0.50)             | 0.34<br>(0.44)          |
| Constant                                    | -0.55<br>(0.49)             | -1.66**<br>(0.41)          | -0.77<br>(0.54)               | -0.32<br>(0.27)              | -0.11<br>(0.28)            | -0.36<br>(0.25)         |
| Observations                                | 1087                        | 933                        | 416                           | 1173                         | 1327                       | 1844                    |
| $r^2$                                       | 0.24                        | 0.28                       | 0.20                          | 0.25                         | 0.24                       | 0.26                    |
| Log-likelihood ratio                        | -603.29                     | -484.16                    | -196.46                       | -577.02                      | -687.64                    | -977.89                 |
| AIC   | 1248.57                     | 1010.31                    | 434.93                        | 1196.03                      | 1417.28                    | 1997.78                 |

+  $p < 0.10$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses.

## SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000305541600040X>

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