Madison’s Theory: Self-Interest & Ambition as the Solution

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Solution: *Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.*

Meeting Agenda:

1. Problem of Human Nature & Solution of The Republic
2. Institutionalizing Ambition to Solve Human Nature
3. Madison’s Republic as a Theory
Reviewing the Problem of Human Nature

- Opening Question: According to Madison, what’s the fundamental problem of human nature in society?
- How does Madison solve the problem posed by human nature with respect to governing & securing public goods?
- Why does Madison reject the idea of “great statesmen” as reliable agents of factions?

If men were angels, no government would be necessary.

*James Madison*
Consequence of *Unchecked* Ambition & Faction

“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good... It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”
"these exterior provisions are... inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."

"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
Cont. *The Republic* As the Solution

**How to operationalize the *Departments* to protect *Public Good***

“We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.”

**Preeminence of the Legislature & Insuring *Conflict***

“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconvenience is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”
Cont. *The Republic* As the Solution

Extra Layer of Complexity: *Federalism*

“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”

- How do you think the complexity of federalism further pits “ambition against ambition?”
- Currently, Republican Governors (ex: NV, OH, MA) are opposing their Senate co-partisan majority in advocating for the *BCRA*. Given Madison, why is that the case?
- Further *dispersion* of power and pitting faction against faction
### The Republic Theory in Practice

**Institutional Logic of “Separation of Powers”**

#### Legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Incentive</strong></th>
<th><strong>House</strong></th>
<th><strong>Senate</strong></th>
<th><strong>President</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term of Office</strong></td>
<td>2 yrs</td>
<td>6 yrs</td>
<td>4 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apportionment</strong></td>
<td>Proport.</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal + Prop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituency</strong></td>
<td>[District]</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>[435]</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection</strong></td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>[Elected]</td>
<td>[Elected]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Resources

| **Action** | Legislature, raise army, tax, interstate commerce, purse, impeach, declare war |
| **Reaction:** | Veto override, Senate confirmation, treaties |
| **v. Congress/Pres** | Set jurisdiction, initiate |
| **Reaction:** | const. amend., confirmation, purse impeach, lower courts |
| **v. Courts** |  |

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Note: [brackets] denotes non-constitutional requirement.
Incentives Key: *Interest of the Man & Personal Motives*

“The interest of the man must be connected with the **constitutional rights of the place**. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

**Constitutional Rights of Place**

“...the power surrendered by the people is...subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”
Why is Heller pledging to vote against his party’s signature healthcare bill?
Formalizing *The Republic* Theory of Government

**Representing Faction (Primarily Federalist 10)**

- Human Nature $\rightarrow_1$ Factions $\leftrightarrow_2$ Representation
- Where: $\rightarrow_1 =$ Self-interest & $\leftrightarrow_2 =$ Elections
- Election & re-election ($\leftrightarrow_2$) critical to theory: protects against agency loss by faction (voters)

**Harnessing Self-Interest & Ensuring Conflict (Federalist 51)**

- Three *Departments*: Congress $\Leftrightarrow$ President $\Leftrightarrow$ Judiciary
- Bicameralism of Congress: U.S. House $\Leftrightarrow$ U.S. Senate
- Federalism: State governments $\Leftrightarrow$ Federal government
- Where $\Leftrightarrow =$ conflict & “constitutional rights of place” (i.e. checks & balances/dependence of action)
- Result: *strong status-quo bias*, why?
- Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms & constituency
Key Points:

- Key to constitutional government: control effects (conflict) of faction by involving spirit of party & faction, elections critical to representative government

- Self-Interest of political actors & collective institutions safeguards against tyranny of majority & loss of liberty: “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”

- Self-interest provided by varying incentives (personal motives) across different institutions (Congress, President, Judiciary, state governments); election incentive

- Dispersing powers across different departments (branches) provides “constitutional rights of place”

- Each department given necessary resources (constitutional rights of the place) to check other branch

- Dispersion of power = strong status quo bias & ↑ transaction costs