Change in Representation: Are Citizens Represented in the System?

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Variation in “Home-Style” District-Centered Representation Partisan-Centered Representation

Agenda

1 Variation in “Home-Style”

2 District-Centered Representation

3 Partisan-Centered Representation
Variation in Member Means of Re-election

- Grimmer (2013) finds that marginal member’s develop differing “home-styles” based on needs of re-election
- Appropriators or Position takers? What do you think the differences in these members are?
- What sort of activities do appropriators engage in & what type of activities do position takers engage in?
- For which member is committee or important and for which member is party more important?
Variation in “Home-Style” District-Centered Representation

Partisan-Centered Representation

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Figure 3: Marginal Legislators Systematically Emphasize Appropriations and Avoid Policy
### District vs. Party in Congress

#### Congress Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Centered</th>
<th>Party Centered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committees</strong></td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policies</strong></td>
<td>Particularized Policy; Universalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Incumbency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td>Individual responsibility, district-focused responsiveness to median voter</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective responsibility, ideological conflict, partisan tides decide MC fate</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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What does district-centered representation look like with respect to congruence between constituent & member ideology?
Who determines “district ideology” under the district-centered model? What incentive for candidates?
District-Centered Representation: *Miller & Stokes*

- Two contrasting models of representation: *delegate* vs. *trustee* model
- Which does Madison's *Republic* adhere to?
- Under what conditions are constituents able to influence representation? How is representation conceptualized as?
- Constituents influence MCs on social policies (Burkean model)
- On Civil Rights, MCs using the delegate model (usually regional salience wins out over partisan salience)
- View of voters: ambivalent and low information on how MCs provide ideological representation
Consequence of Being “Out-of-Step”? 

“You can only go so far in Texas... there’s nothing more useless to the Democrats than a dead liberal.” Rep. Lyndon Johnson (D-TX)

► Another assumption about voters: “individual voters are fairly ignorant about members’ policy actions”

► However, are members still attentive to constituent opinion? Particularly which constituents under the district-centered model?

► What do Canes-Wrone & her authors find?

► Electoral consequence for “out-of-step” members that privilege party over district preferences

► Extremists less likely to be re-elected & they lose vote-share (both in marginal & safe seats)

► Evidence for the district-centered model?
What does partisan-centered representation look like with respect to congruence between constituent & member ideology?

![Partisan Model of Congressional Representation Diagram]
- Who determines “district ideology” under the district-centered model? What incentive for candidates?
Implications of the *Partisan-Model*

- What’s Bafumi & Herron’s argument?
- *Leap-frog representation*: median voter “leap-frogged” & change in representation happens at the extremes

**Leapfrog Representation: Change in Representation among Swing Districts, 2010**

- Defeated Democratic Candidates
- Victorious Republican Candidates

- Extremely Liberal
- Average District
- Extremely Conservative
Implications of the *Partisan Model*

- What are the implications of the *partisan model* with respect to accountability?
- Collective responsibility more paramount in *partisan model*
- Which set of voters are pivotal in the partisan model?
- Which legislative chamber is relatively “more extreme” according to Bafumi & Herron? What are the implications for transaction costs?
- Why would this disconnect between the median voter & member ideology exist?
- Are MCs more *ideologically extreme* than their constituents? What’s the implications for this with respect to Madison’s *Republic*?
Contrasting Sources of Representation

- If A is dominant, which system of representation do you get?
- If B is dominant, which system of representation do you get?
- What if C is dominant, which system of representation do you get?
Evidence of *Change* in Representation

- Which Congress is more consistent with the “district-model?”
- Which is more consistent with the “partisan model?”
Evidence for the Partisan Model? Candidate Emergence

House Candidates' Ideological Positions by District Ideology Preferences in the 2016 Elections

Dem. Cand. Ideology = -0.88 + 0.38 × District Ideology, R² = 0.09

Conservative

Liberal
Evidence for the Partisan Model? Winning Candidates

House Winning Candidates' Ideological Positions by District Ideology Preferences in the 2016 Elections

Dem. Cand. Ideology = -0.99 × 0.25 × District Ideology, \( R^2 = 0.04 \)

Rep. Cand. Ideology = 0.02 + 0.02 × District Ideology, \( R^2 = 0.06 \)

Variation in “Home-Style” District-Centered Representation Partisan-Centered Representation

Candidate Ideological Positions (Liberal-Conservative)

-2
-1
0
1

-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.33

Liberal

Conservative

95% Confidence Intervals

Fitted Values

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Is there evidence that district ideology influences representative’s party? Does this fit with any of the models discussed?
Contrasting Representation Outcomes Across Models

Contrasting the Madisonian, Partisan & Hybrid Models of Representation

- How is the model a blend of the Madisonian & partisan model? Does this fit Bafumi & Shapiro’s thesis?
Key Points:

▶ Members adjust their “home-styles” based on districts, districts conditions what MCs do to get re-elected
▶ Madisonian Theory suggests perfect congruence between district (median voter) preferences & member ideology
▶ Miller & Stokes find in the 1960’s that MCs largely responsive to district preferences on social policies but not & foreign policy
▶ Canes-Wrone find a penalty for voters that are “out-of-step with district”
▶ Current partisan polarization leads to “leap-frog” representation
▶ Greater variation within party (not perfect) leads to hybrid model between district & party models