

Madison's Theory: Self-Interest & Ambition as the Solution

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Quick Syllabus Updates

No Seminar next Tuesday July 4th

Exam Dates

- ▶ Midterm Exam: July 17, 2017 (Monday)
- ▶ Midterm Exam Review: July 13, 2017 (Thursday during Discussion Period)
- ▶ Final Exam: August 2, 2017 (Wednesday, Final Class Meeting)
- ▶ Final Exam Review: August 1, 2017 (Tuesday) & Half of July 27, 2017 (Thursday during Discussion Period)

Substantive Discussion Sections (TR 12:10-1:50 Olson 106)

- ▶ July 6, 2017: Meeting 6 *Overcoming Limited Information: How Citizens use Short-Cuts to Act*
- ▶ July 20, 2017: Meeting 14 *Change in Representation: Are Citizens Represented in the System?*
- ▶ July 27, 2017: Meeting 18 *How Democratic is the U.S.? Policy Responsiveness*


Note: Non-exam review & substantive discussion periods will be treated as traditional discussion seminars (i.e. discussing course material).

Solution: *Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.*

Meeting Agenda:

- 1 Problem of Human Nature & Solution of The Republic
- 2 Institutionalizing Ambition to Solve Human Nature
- 3 Madison's Republic as a Theory

Reviewing the Problem of Human Nature




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James Madison

- Opening Question: According to Madison, what's the fundamental problem of human nature in society?

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


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- ▶ How does Madison solve the problem posed by human nature with respect to governing & securing public goods?

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- ▶ How does Madison solve the problem posed by human nature with respect to governing & securing public goods?
- ▶ Why does Madison reject the idea of “great statesmen” as reliable agents of factions?

Federalist 10 & Unchecked Ambition/Human Nature

Consequence of *Unchecked* Ambition & Faction

“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; **an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power**; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.”

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The Republic As the Solution

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Self-Interest *inherent* the *Departments*

“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and **personal motives** to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. **Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.**”

Cont. *The Republic* As the Solution

How to operationalize the *Departments* to protect *Public Good*

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Preeminence of the Legislature & Insuring *Conflict*

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Preeminence of the Legislature & Insuring *Conflict*

"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit."

Cont. *The Republic* As the Solution

Extra Layer of Complexity: *Federalism*

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“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”

- ▶ How do you think the complexity of federalism further pits “ambition against ambition?”

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- ▶ Currently, Republican Governors (ex: NV, OH, MA) are opposing their Senate co-partisan majority in advocating for the *BCRA*. Given Madison, why is that the case?

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- ▶ Further *dispersion* of power and pitting faction against faction

The Republic Theory in Practice

Institutional Logic of "Separation of Powers"

Legislature

	House	Senate	President
<i>Incentive</i>			
Term of Office	2 yrs	6 yrs	4 yrs
Apportionment	Proport.	Federal	Federal + Prop
Constituency	[District]	State	National
Size	[435]	100	1
Selection	Elected	[Elected]	[Elected]
<i>Resources</i>			
<i>Action</i>	Legislate, raise army, tax, interstate commerce, purse, impeach impeachment, declare war		Appointment, pardon, Commander-in-chief, Executive
<i>Reaction:</i>	Veto override, Senate		Veto,
<i>v. Congress/Pres</i>	confirmation, treaties		Execute the law
<i>Reaction:</i>	Set jurisdiction, initiate		Nomination
<i>v. Courts</i>	const. amend., confirmation, purse impeach, lower courts		
Note: [brackets] denotes non-constitutional requirement.			

Institutional Logic: Incentives & Resources

Incentives Key: *Interest of the Man & Personal Motives*

"The interest of the man must be connected with the **constitutional rights of the place**. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary."

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Constitutional Rights of Place

"... the power surrendered by the people is... subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."

Ex: Sen. Dean Heller (R-NV) & BRCA

POLITICS

Republican Senator Vital to Health Bill's Passage Won't Support It

By JONATHAN MARTIN and ALEXANDER BURNS JUNE 23, 2017



Senator Dean Heller, Republican of Nevada, announced on Friday that he would not support the current version of the Senate health care bill. By CBS, VIA REUTERS. Photo by Andrew Harnik/Associated Press. [Watch in Times Video »](#)



The A.H.C.A.: Repealing Obamacare

Complete coverage of the American Health Care Act, the Republican plan to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act.

- Vote Delayed as G.O.P. Struggles to Marshal Support for Health Care Bill JUN 27
- Senate Health Bill in Peril as C.B.O. Predicts 22 Million More Uninsured JUN 26
- Senate Health Plan Falls Short of Promise for Cheaper Care, Experts Say JUN 23
- How Medicaid Works, and Who It Covers JUN 23
- Planned Parenthood Battle Could Sway Fortunes of G.O.P. Health Bill JUN 23

- Why is Heller pledging to vote against his party's signature healthcare bill?

Formalizing *The Republic* Theory of Government

Representing Faction (Primarily Federalist 10)

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- ▶ Result: *strong status-quo bias*, why?
- ▶ Differing incentives insured primarily by varying terms & constituency

Key Points:

- ▶ Key to constitutional government: control *effects* (conflict) of faction *by involving spirit of party & faction*, elections critical to representative government
- ▶ Self-Interest of political actors & collective institutions safeguards against tyranny of majority & loss of liberty: “ambition must be made to counteract ambition”
- ▶ Self-interest provided by varying incentives (*personal motives*) across different institutions (Congress, President, Judiciary, state governments); election incentive
- ▶ Dispersing powers across different *departments* (branches) provides “constitutional rights of place”
- ▶ Each *department* given necessary **resources** (*constitutional rights of the place*) to check other branch
- ▶ Dispersion of power = strong status quo bias & ↑ transaction costs